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BUSTING UP THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY 
Andrew S. Pollis* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is by now axiomatic that the objective of the civil lawsuit has evolved.  
Litigants no longer routinely take their disputes to trial.1  Some claim that a 
culture of settlement has supplanted the culture of trial resolution.2  As one 
scholar notes, “The focus on conciliation and consensus is so dominant that, 
stunningly, going to trial is seen as pathological—as a ‘failure’ of the 
system.”3 
But the vanishing trial does not necessarily leave settlement as the 
singular focus of civil litigation.  What has supplanted the trial culture is not 
settlement alone but rather a culture of pretrial practice.4  Twenty-first-
century litigation has come to revolve around the two hallmarks of pretrial 
practice:  protracted discovery and dispositive motions.  Unquestionably, 
settlement is one of the driving objectives; adversaries seek to make 
litigation as painful and expensive as possible for each other so that 
settlement becomes the better option.  Yet there is a second, omnipresent 
objective:  maximization of fees for lawyers who charge their clients by the 
hour.5  One law firm’s fee-driven approach was recently exposed in 
 
*  Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  Many thanks to Fordham 
University School of Law and Bruce Green for the invitation to contribute to this important 
colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials and to the other 
participants for their engaging scholarship and insightful comments, particularly Howard 
Erichson.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond 
the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration 
Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017). 
 
 1. See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 2 (2016) (“The jury has 
essentially vanished.”); see also infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 2. See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All over Again?:  Pretrial as Trial in Complex 
Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 647 (2011) (“Settlement rather than trial has emerged as 
the dominant endgame of civil litigation, especially litigation complex in substance or 
procedural format.”); Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender:  Summary Jury 
Trial as a Means to Overcome Iqbal’s Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication, 
Negotiation and Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1149, 1150 n.1 
(2010) (collecting authorities); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1075 (1984) (critiquing settlement as inconsonant with justice). 
 3. Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 65 
EMORY L.J. 1491, 1511 (2016). 
 4. See id. at 1512 (“Part and parcel of the vanishing trial is a focus on pretrial 
practice.”). 
 5. See Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule:  A 
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 246 
(1996) (“Attorneys who work on an hourly fee basis have an incentive to defer settlement 
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litigation where discovery uncovered a partner gleefully celebrating the size 
of a bill and encouraging his colleagues to “[c]hurn that bill, baby!”6  It is 
the worst-kept secret in the legal profession. 
These twin objectives—extracting settlement and maximizing billable 
hours—have fostered a subculture of litigation that can obscure the goal of 
“ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”7  Particularly in 
high-stakes litigation, the pretrial phase of a lawsuit has become “a stage 
unto itself, no longer a prelude to trial but rather assumed to be the way to 
end a case without trial”8—in short, a pretrial industry.  Moreover, its 
emergence raises important questions about the ethical obligations of 
lawyers to avoid improperly exploiting the powerful tools afforded by the 
judicial system for their clients’ or their own personal gain.9 
The judicial system does a poor job of responding.  Judges are typically 
eager to move cases from their dockets by encouraging parties to settle.10  
They can also be slow and reluctant to rule on civil motions, particularly 
discovery motions.11  As a consequence, courts often turn a blind eye to 
abuses, so parties often have the unbridled ability to pursue or to obstruct 
discovery, regardless of the merits of their positions.12  To make matters 
worse, the judicial system has reacted to the pretrial industry by erecting 
barriers that purport to address the problem but that actually impose 
disproportionate burdens on the parties least able to bear them.13  Through 
 
and to continue working on the case as long as their return per hour of work on the case 
exceeds their opportunity cost of time.  Thus, hourly fee attorneys may sometimes 
recommend against settlement early in the litigation even when settlement would be in the 
client’s best interest.”). 
 6. Andrew Strickler, DLA Piper Emails a Wake-Up Call on Bill Padding, LAW360 
(Mar. 26, 2013, 9:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/427386/dla-piper-emails-a-
wake-up-call-on-bill-padding?article_related_content=1 [https://perma.cc/R5KH-KQS8]. 
 7. See FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 8. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:  Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000). 
 9. To be sure, some commentators have offered a more charitable view.  John H. 
Langbein ascribes the demise of the civil trial to the “better mousetrap” reflected in the civil 
rules:  “a civil procedure centered in pretrial discovery.  Litigants no longer go to trial 
because they no longer need to.” John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the 
United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 569 (2012). 
 10. See Freer, supra note 3, at 1508. 
 11. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text; see also James G. Carr, From the 
Bench:  Fixing Discovery:  The Judge’s Job, LITIGATION, Summer–Fall 2012, at 8 
(“[A]djudication of discovery motions takes time.  The busier the court, the less time it has 
for such ancillary disputes.”); John Burritt McArthur, The Strange Case of American Civil 
Procedure and the Missing Uniform Discovery Time Limits, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 865, 883 
n.51 (1996) (“[J]udges can get bogged down in trial and trial delays gradually back up the 
judicial time necessary to handle discovery matters.”). 
 12. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 
27 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1992) (noting the “injustices of unbridled discovery”); Ettie Ward, The 
After-Shocks of Twombly:  Will We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
893, 914 (2008) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s concern about “unbridled large-case 
discovery and the perceived inability of trial judges to control it”). 
 13. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and 
Trials on the Merits:  Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 286, 304 (2013) (stating that the Supreme Court’s support of litigation reforms “seems 
to have placed a thumb on the justice scale favoring corporate and government defendants”). 
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higher pleading standards, tighter discovery rules, and greater reliance on 
summary judgment, judges have made it virtually impossible for parties 
with legitimate grievances but limited resources to have their day in court, 
especially against wealthier adversaries.14  As Arthur Miller explained, 
“[T]he federal courts have erected a sequence of procedural stop signs 
during the past twenty-five years that has transformed the relatively 
uncluttered pretrial process envisioned by the original drafters of the 
Federal Rules into a morass of litigation friction points.”15 
While some argue that “[r]eturning to a trial model would be a significant 
step toward fulfilling the traditional expectations for the federal courts,”16 
that step backward is unlikely to occur.  But I agree that fixes are in order, 
and I offer two.  First, we should consider requiring at least some parties to 
engage in early settlement evaluation—ideally before extensive discovery 
gets underway—by submitting cases to summary jury trials and imposing 
consequences on parties who choose to disregard the results.  Second, we 
should allocate a greater percentage of judicial resources to discovery 
management through the routine appointment of special masters to curtail 
the discovery free-for-all.  Neither fix is without its costs, but the costs are 
likely much lower than the costs of perpetuating the pretrial industry that 
currently drives civil litigation in the United States. 
I.  INCENTIVES THAT PROMOTE THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY 
Oft-quoted statistics, relying heavily on Professor Marc Galanter’s 
research,17 reinforce the now-familiar truism that most civil cases do not 
end in trial.  Absolute numbers of trials have dropped in the last several 
decades, even as civil filings have increased dramatically.18  The percentage 
of civil cases ending in trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to only 1.8 
percent in 2002.19  Certainly some of the nontrial dispositions are the 
product of judicial rulings on pretrial motions but most—perhaps as high as 
95 percent of civil cases—terminate through settlement20 to the point where 
 
 14. See generally Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare:  The Disappearance of Low-Income 
Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531 (2016). 
 15. Miller, supra note 13, at 309. 
 16. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 
DUKE L.J. 745, 762 (2010). 
 17. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 1 
(“[O]ur federal courts actually tried fewer cases in 2002 than they did in 1962, despite a 
fivefold increase in the number of civil filings . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 19. See id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 1, at 2 (citing different statistics, but reaching 
the same general conclusion); John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent & Pamela Martin, A Profile of 
Settlement, COURT REV., Fall–Winter 2006, at 34 (noting that less than 3 percent of civil 
cases terminate in a trial verdict). 
 20. See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternate Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 818, 820 (1988). But see Barkai, Kent & Martin, supra note 19, at 35 
(“Although ‘most cases settle,’ the percentage of cases that settle varies dramatically by the 
type of case. . . .  Contrary to the popular saying, nowhere near 90% or more of cases settle 
(although torts come close).”). 
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commentators describe a “judicial ‘settlement culture’” that “has become 
pervasive in the federal courts.”21 
Concurrently, there is a well-recognized reality that financial 
considerations play a larger role in driving the legal profession than they 
did when trials were more frequent.  In fact, “the prevailing trend within the 
legal community has been to associate the decline of professionalism in the 
practice of law with the emergence of increasing commercialism, indicating 
that law has become more a business than a profession.”22  This dynamic 
plays itself out in two competing ways.  On the one hand, lawyers who 
charge their clients by the hour or project have an incentive to increase the 
volume of billable work.23  On the other hand, lawyers compete for client 
business based at least in part on the cost-effectiveness of their services.24 
One of the ways lawyers sometimes reconcile the competing business 
incentives is to drive up their adversaries’ litigation costs.  Litigation costs 
sometimes matter more in pricing settlements than the merits of the 
underlying claims.25  Thus, the more pain lawyers can inflict, the better the 
settlement deal they can ostensibly extract for their clients.26  The pain can 
be in the form of the direct monetary costs of litigation, or it can be in the 
form of business disruption, negative publicity, and risk (even small risk or 
just the perception of small risk) of catastrophic liability.  So, if the clients 
have the resources and the will to endorse the pain-infliction philosophy, 
lawyers achieve their objective of maximizing firm revenue while 
simultaneously furthering their clients’ ostensible interests.  As a result, 
pretrial activities serve not to prepare the best case for a trial (which will 
almost never happen) but instead serve to win a pretrial victory.  Lawyers 
exploit the pretrial tools not only for a victory through motion practice but 
also for fee generation and settlement leverage.  These latter ends, though 
 
 21. Freer, supra note 3, at 1509. 
 22. Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism:  Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. 
L. REV. 217, 218 (2002). 
 23. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:  How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 956 (2000) (“[I]t is not at all evident that 
practitioners, even highly ethical professionals, resist market incentives in any systematic 
way.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Jay Fitzgerald, Corporate Clients Shift Priorities for Law Firms, BOS. 
GLOBE (Mar. 2, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/03/02/white-shoe-law-
firms-scuffed-lower-cost-competition-and-growing-clout-corporate-clients/R7E5m4U4njUj 
RzBtVFJGKL/story.html [https://perma.cc/P23C-LPL7]. 
 25. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 437, 437 (1988); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) 
(“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases . . . .”); Nagareda, supra note 2, at 655 (“As [the probability of success on the 
merits] approaches zero, the settlement zone for a given lawsuit will tend to be defined 
primarily by the sum of the two sides’ litigation costs.”). 
 26. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick & Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary 
Judgment 5–17 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 16-47, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845627 (describing costs of discovery and incentives for lawyers 
to abuse it for purposes of exacting settlement leverage) [https://perma.cc/7SVD-EYPF]. 
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divorced from the stated objectives of the civil rules,27 are the incentives 
that ultimately drive the abuses rampant in the pretrial industry. 
The paradigm applies most logically to large-firm practice, where clients 
pay by the hour or the project.  Liberal discovery rules are “chiefly 
responsible for the increased cost of legal services and for increased lawyer 
wealth in the last part of the twentieth century.”28  In turn, “[l]arge firms vie 
for reputations that lead to rankings such as most ‘fearsome’—a category 
describing firms that ‘threaten to disrupt business as usual’ and ‘have the 
ability to impact operations, rack up costly bills and potentially ruin 
reputations.’”29  The paradigm also applies to lawyers who charge 
contingent fees and who exploit pretrial devices to extract what Judge 
Richard A. Posner, channeling Judge Henry Friendly, has characterized as 
“blackmail settlements.”30  Lawyers who do not charge by the hour or by 
the project certainly have a financial incentive to procure the highest 
possible settlement with the least amount of work,31 but they also know that 
their successful exploitation of the pretrial tools will bear directly on the 
size of the settlements they can extract from their adversaries. 
From an ethical standpoint, we should certainly find these incentives 
troubling, as we would in any commercial industry that permits a service 
provider to exploit her customer.  But the legal profession is no ordinary 
service provider; we are governed by ethical rules requiring us to expend 
“reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the 
client”32 and proscribe frivolous discovery conduct.33  Certainly most 
lawyers honor their ethical obligations, but they do so in spite of, not in 
keeping with, economic incentives.  And the self-regulated nature of the 
legal profession fails adequately to curb the behavior of lawyers unable to 
resist the economic rewards of the unethical litigation conduct that can 
infect the pretrial industry.34 
 
 27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules . . . should be construed, administered, and 
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”). 
 28. Freer, supra note 3, at 1514. 
 29. Andrew S. Pollis, Trying the Trial, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 55, 71 (2016) (quoting 
Janet H. Cho, Jones Day Again Makes the “Fearsome Foursome,” the Top 4 Law Firms 
Clients Most Dread Facing, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:29 AM), http:// 
www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2014/10/jones_day_again_makes_the_fearsome_fou
rsome_the_top_4_law_firms_clients_most_dread_facing.html [https://perma.cc/MS98-WK 
KZ]). 
 30. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995); see also 
Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1674 (2011). 
 31. See Kessler et al., supra note 5, at 246 (noting that economically, “the contingent fee 
lawyer has an incentive to settle a case very early in the litigation, even for an amount much 
lower than the client would receive after trial, because the attorney bears all the litigation 
expenses and can earn a high hourly fee by an early settlement”); see also Frank B. Cross, 
The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.J. 523, 546 
(1996). 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 33. See id. r. 3.4(d). 
 34. See Pollis, supra note 29, at 107–08. 
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II.  LITIGATION TACTICS THAT 
ANIMATE THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY 
If the rise of the pretrial industry is contrary to the purpose of the civil 
rules, it certainly finds ammunition—even implicit endorsement—in the 
procedural tactics the rules themselves authorize.  Chris Guthrie has 
suggested that “the labyrinthine structure created by the rules virtually 
guarantees” that litigants will “traverse pretrial and trial processes that are 
almost invariably lengthy and costly.”35  Because lawyers inclined to use 
the civil rules as weapons tend to exploit the various methods of pretrial 
discovery (and methods of avoiding it), Part II.A addresses those discovery 
tactics first.  Part II.B then addresses the other major weapons that 
constitute the arsenal of the pretrial industry:  motions to dismiss (based on 
now-heightened pleading standards) and motions for summary judgment. 
A.  Discovery Machinations as the Primary Currency 
of the Pretrial Industry 
Civil litigants ostensibly enjoy the privilege of discovering relevant 
information36 through several devices, including interrogatories,37 requests 
for admissions,38 document requests,39 and depositions.40  These devices 
impose a multitiered matrix of burdens that are ripe for attorneys to exploit, 
constituting “as much as 90 percent of litigation costs,”41 particularly in 
high-stakes litigation or litigation in which at least one of the parties can 
afford to pursue aggressive discovery as a way of wearing down its 
opponent. 
At the most superficial level, the party requesting written discovery (or 
that party’s lawyer in contingent fee cases) bears the relatively manageable 
cost of preparing the discovery requests, while the responding party bears 
the sometimes “exorbitant” cost of responding.42  Depositions may require 
equal time for the lawyers (for preparation and attendance), but they impose 
 
 35. Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1115, 1121 (2003). 
 36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). 
 37. See id. 33. 
 38. See id. 36. 
 39. See id. 34. 
 40. See id. 30. 
 41. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (citing Memorandum from 
Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, 
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)); 
see also Victor Marrero, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 
1656–57 (2016) (“Financially, discovery is unmatched among the major sources of litigation 
costs; it generates more legal fees and expenses than any other round of court proceedings.  
According to various estimates, discovery can consume from fifty to as much as ninety 
percent of total legal costs in some cases.”). 
 42. See Byron C. Keeling, A Prescription for Healing the Crisis in Professionalism:  
Shifting the Burden of Enforcing Professional Standards of Conduct, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
31, 36–37 (1993). See generally Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the 
Future:  Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
773 (2011). 
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a far greater burden on the party being deposed or that party’s employer (for 
time away from productivity and anxiety over the deposition process) than 
on the party taking the deposition.  Thus, at the superficial level, the party 
requesting discovery has the capacity to create settlement leverage by 
pursuing an aggressive discovery plan that will impose significant burdens 
on its adversary. 
But, as every litigator knows, there is much more to it.  At the superficial 
level, pretrial discovery proceeds without court involvement; there is no 
need for a court order to initiate discovery.43  Moreover, the responding 
party need not obtain a court order to resist written discovery; the rules 
permit a party to stand on objections in lieu of providing substantive 
information or producing documents responsive to written discovery 
requests.44  And, of course, even a party who provides some substantive 
information or documents can also withhold some, often leaving the 
requesting party uncertain whether anything has been withheld (and, if so, 
what it is).45  Thus, the incentives from both an attorney-fee and settlement-
leverage standpoint encourage lawyers to serve onerous discovery requests 
on adversaries while holding back substantive responses to the extent 
possible and litigating their positions if challenged. 
Depositions work slightly differently but in ways that actually foment the 
problem because they are easy to initiate and burdensome to oppose.  A 
party may not avoid a deposition simply by objecting, as she may do (at 
least at first) in the case of written discovery requests.  Instead, the would-
be deponent must apply for a protective order ahead of the scheduled 
deposition to avoid having to appear at the time and place designated by the 
requestor.46  Thus, the mere serving of a one-paragraph deposition notice47 
triggers a duty on the deponent either to attend or to seek a protective 
order.48  Both options are far more burdensome than the requesting party’s 
simple task of drafting and serving the notice. 
The burdens are even greater if the deposition notice is directed to an 
entity and designates specific topics on which the deponent must be 
knowledgeable.  In that event, the “named organization must then 
 
 43. The only predicate to initiating discovery is a prediscovery meeting with opposing 
counsel, designed ostensibly to avoid discovery disputes. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1), (f); 
see also id. 26(d)(2) (authorizing service of document requests twenty-one days after service 
of the summons but deeming those requests served as of the date of the first Rule 26(f) 
conference).  To be sure, the rules authorize trial courts to “modify the extent of discovery” 
at an initial pretrial conference. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii).  But the decision whether 
even to schedule such a conference lies in the “sound discretion of the trial court.” Hayden v. 
Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1960); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (stating 
that the court “may” hold pretrial conference). 
 44. See, e.g., Badalamenti v. Dunham’s, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(listing various options in responding to document requests, including merely “objecting”). 
 45. The 2015 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C) now requires objections to “state 
whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”  It is too 
early to assess the effect of that new requirement. 
 46. See, e.g., Kamps v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson L.L.P., 274 F.R.D. 115, 
118 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1). 
 48. See id. 26(c). 
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designate” a representative “to testify on its behalf.”49  The preparation of 
such a representative for deposition can be “onerous.”50  And the failure to 
prepare the witness adequately is “tantamount to a failure to appear” for the 
deposition at all.51  The service of such a deposition notice therefore 
automatically imposes significant costs on an adversary. 
The burdens increase demonstrably when court intervention is required.  
A party that wishes to challenge objections to written discovery may move 
the court to compel it,52 just as a party seeking to avoid a deposition may 
seek a protective order.  But in both cases, the movant must certify to the 
court that she has attempted to resolve the matter with opposing counsel 
before bringing her motion,53 so the parties must go through the process of 
detailing their respective positions and seeking to come to common ground.  
While this “meet-and-confer” requirement has, theoretically at least, the 
salutary benefit of eliminating or streamlining the disputes that require 
judicial involvement,54 it can delay the ultimate resolution of the discovery 
dispute.55  And the meet-and-confer requirement actually provides 
additional incentives not to provide discovery in the first instance because 
the responding party knows that its adversary cannot move to compel 
discovery without having first attempted these premotion negotiations; the 
withholding party can thus eventually retreat from unreasonable positions 
with impunity, depriving the requesting party an opportunity to expose the 
recalcitrance to the court. 
Even when the process moves to the point of motion practice (a costly 
exercise in itself),56 the very nature of discovery disputes renders them 
vulnerable to poor judicial oversight.57  The fact-intensive nature of the 
 
 49. Id. 30(b)(6); see also James C. Winton, Corporate Representative Depositions 
Revisited, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 938, 971 (2013) (“[T]he burden is on the corporation to gather 
and present testimony on the subjects designated.”).  Commentators have suggested that the 
burden thus imposed on the entity can be draconian. See, e.g., Kent Sinclair & Roger P. 
Fendrich, Discovering Corporate Knowledge and Contentions:  Rethinking Rule 30(b)(6) 
and Alternative Mechanisms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 651, 728–29 (1999). 
 50. Calzaturficio S.C.A.R.P.A. s.p.a. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D. Mass. 
2001); Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 639 (D. Minn. 2000). 
 51. Black Horse Lane Assocs., L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 304 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). 
 53. See id. 37(a)(1) (“The motion must include a certification that the movant has in 
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make 
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.”); id. 26(c)(1) (same). 
 54. See, e.g., Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 197, 199 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The entire purpose 
of the meet-and-confer rule is to force litigants to attempt to resolve, or a [sic] least narrow, 
the disputed issues to prevent the unnecessary waste of time and effort on any given 
motion.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Big River Tel. Co., No. 08-2046-JWL, 2009 WL 
1580307, at *1 (D. Kan. June 4, 2009) (questioning “whether the letter and the spirit of the 
meet-and-confer rules were actually satisfied,” but resolving the discovery dispute “in the 
interest of avoiding further delay”). 
 56. See, e.g., Curtis E.A. Karnow, Complexity in Litigation:  A Differential Diagnosis, 
18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 52 (2015) (describing “formal discovery motion” as “cumbersome” 
and “expensive”). 
 57. Indeed, “judicial reluctance to deal with discovery disputes is due in part to the 
courts’ lack of the time and resources necessary to engage in the fact-intensive review and in 
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disputes is often a serious impediment to timely judicial attention, 
particularly because of other, ostensibly more pressing, obligations judges 
must fulfill.58  So discovery disputes can linger, usually to the advantage of 
one side.  When judges do rule on discovery disputes, they often lack the 
factual background to appreciate important nuances or the extent to which 
either side may have engaged in questionable discovery tactics, and they 
lack the time and inclination to dig into the finer points.59  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized as much, noting that “the success 
of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest 
side.”60 
The 2015 amendments to the federal discovery rules61 were designed 
“ostensibly to make litigation faster and cheaper”62 and thus to curtail some 
of the currency of the pretrial industry.63  But there are no substantive 
changes in the rules that will ensure significant change,64 so it is 
questionable whether the changes will make progress toward that objective. 
The most important change is to the language setting forth the standard 
for discovery.  Until 2015, information was discoverable if it was 
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”65  
Now, the standard expressed in the rule is that a party may request even 
relevant discovery only if it is “proportional to the needs of the case,” with 
several factors informing that proportionality test.66  It is too soon to assess 
the practical effect of this language change,67 and some have suggested that 
 
part to the courts’ unwillingness to make fact-dependent calls as to lawyers’ professional 
behavior.” Lindsey D. Blanchard, Rule 37(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”:  More Bark Than 
Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 132 n.88 (2011). 
 58. See id. at 126 (“[J]udges increasingly have little time to spare.”). 
 59. See id. at 127–28. 
 60. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). 
 61. The Supreme Court submitted to Congress the 2015 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure on April 29, 2015, see Letter from John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 
2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Z9LU-XC4V], and they went into effect on December 1, 2015, see Order Amending the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court 
orders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9LU-XC4V]. 
 62. Kenneth R. Berman, Reinventing Discovery Under the New Federal Rules, 
LITIGATION, Spring 2016, at 22. 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“[D]iscussions of 
ways to improve the administration of civil justice regularly include pleas to discourage 
over-use, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase cost and result in delay.”). 
 64. See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.  For an excellent summary of the 
rule changes and a summary of the courts’ early application of them, see John M. Barkett, 
The First 100 Days (or So) of the 2015 Civil Rules Amendments, 8 Digital Discovery & e-
Evid. (BNA), 8 DDEE (Apr. 14, 2016). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2007) (amended 2015). 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  The relevant factors informing proportionality are “the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. 
 67. See Barkett, supra note 64. 
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it is no substantive change at all.68  But it stands to reason that the new 
standard will continue to engender discovery battles,69 as will the very fact 
of its newness.  Among other things, the factors that inform 
proportionality70 are fact and case specific, so by definition the scope of 
discovery will differ in every case and will require significant attorney time 
to evaluate and advocate.  Ultimately, permitting less discovery under the 
new standard will lower the aggregate costs of discovery, but the result in 
that scenario simply moves the settlement needle in favor of the party that 
benefits from the procedural change, divorced from the ultimate merits.  
The possibility of exploiting that shift (primarily of benefit to defendants) 
or bearing the burden of it (primarily absorbed by plaintiffs) creates all the 
more incentive for the parties to litigate over the scope of discovery. 
Motion practice also raises the related question of cost shifting and 
sanctions.  The rules ostensibly require the losing party to pay attorney’s 
fees associated with discovery motions,71 but that rule has several 
exceptions, including if “circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust.”72  Other sanctions are available for parties who violate discovery 
orders.73  Yet sanctions can be as effective a tool for the wrongdoer as they 
are for the wronged; discovery disputes often lead to “satellite litigation 
over sanctions,” which “may work to the advantage of the guilty party.”74  
And the available sanctions for lost or missing information—often 
electronically stored information—have also fueled the pretrial industry; 
“[t]he more that lawyers learned of these disputes and how they could alter 
the settlement landscape or secure a case-dispositive sanction, the more 
these disputes proliferated.”75 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the costs inherently associated with 
discovery become exponentially more onerous when lawyers deliberately 
 
 68. See, e.g., Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 5088(RMB)(HBP), 2016 WL 
616386, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (“[T]he 2015 Amendments constitute a reemphasis 
on the importance of proportionality in discovery but not a substantive change in the law.”).  
Even before the amendment, the rule provided that “[t]he frequency or extent 
of . . . discovery . . . shall be limited by the court if it determines that . . . the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(C) (2007) (amended 2015). 
 69. Berman, supra note 62, at 29 (“Lawyers . . . still will have boundary disputes, 
though now over differently defined boundaries.”). 
 70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (“If the motion is granted . . . the court must, after 
giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 
the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s 
reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” (emphasis 
added)); see also id. 37(a)(5)(B) (requiring the movant to pay costs and attorney’s fees if the 
motion is denied); id. 37(b)(2)(C). 
 72. Id. 37(a)(5)(A)–(B). 
 73. Id. 37(b). 
 74. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery 
Misconduct:  Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness 
of the Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 817. 
 75. Berman, supra note 62, at 25. 
2017] BUSTING UP THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY 2107 
exploit the rules to inflict pain on their adversaries.76  “Some have 
analogized these lawyers to Sylvester Stallone’s movie character, the 
bellicose John Rambo,”77 and the generally unsupervised nature of 
discovery lends itself to this sort of exploitation.78  Indeed, “[d]iscovery 
bullies aggressively pursue production of embarrassing or burdensome 
information of questionable or no relevance to the underlying dispute,” 
while “discovery evaders hide the ball; they make the process ‘a game to be 
played by wordsmiths who will exploit every real and imagined ambiguity’ 
to avoid honest responses.”79  Although it is difficult to quantify the extent 
of such abuse, “[t]he general sense of both practitioners and jurists is that 
[it] happens, and it happens a lot.”80  And the costs associated with these 
abusive tactics are more than simply financial.81  Some lawyers and parties 
lack the fortitude and grit to litigate in this highly adversarial environment 
and retreat to mispriced settlement, regardless of the merits of their claims 
or defenses.82  Beyond the costs borne by the parties in individual litigation 
matters, discovery abuse imposes even greater systemic costs on our justice 
system, generating “considerable concern to . . . courts around the 
nation.”83 
B.  Dispositive-Motion Practice as a Secondary Currency 
of the Pretrial Industry 
The second major component of the pretrial industry is dispositive-
motion practice, consisting primarily of motions to dismiss (which typically 
 
 76. See generally Pollis, supra note 29, at 68–70 (discussing the problem of lawyers 
who intentionally engage in abusive litigation tactics to bully their adversaries); G.M. 
Filisko, You’re Out of Order!:  Dealing with the Costs of Incivility in the Legal Profession, 
A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/youre_out_of_ 
order_dealing_with_the_costs_of_incivility_in_the_legal [https://perma.cc/75SP-Q4DF]. 
 77. Pollis, supra note 29, at 68. 
 78. See id. at 70 (“Misbehavior in depositions has been a particular problem, perhaps 
because they proceed in person and without judicial supervision.”). 
 79. Id. at 69 (quoting Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing 
Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 229 (2006)). 
 80. Fitzpatrick & Norris, supra note 26, at 15. 
 81. See, e.g., Marrero, supra note 41, at 1656 (“When carried to extremes, [discovery] 
costs are not only bountiful attorneys’ fees, but also the inordinate time, expense, abuse, and 
frustration for all concerned.”). 
 82. Cf. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry:  The Regret Aversion Theory of 
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (describing “litigants not only as 
calculating creatures, but also as feeling creatures. . . .  [L]itigants base at least some 
litigation decisions on ‘a desire to avoid the unpleasant psychological consequences’ of 
regret arising from ‘a decision that turns out poorly.’” (quoting Richard P. Larrick, 
Motivational Factors in Decision Theories:  The Role of Self-Protection, 113 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 440, 440 (1993))); see also Marrero, supra note 41, at 1658 (“The typical aim of 
excessive discovery tactics is to overwhelm an adversary with serial requests to disclose 
documents of massive proportions or questionable value, or to meet burdensome production 
schedules.  In either event, the design of the demand, as one court observed in a commercial 
dispute, is to drive the inconvenience and costs of litigation so high as to force the opponent 
to abandon the fight.”). 
 83. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 (Del. 1994).  
Despite the generalized concern, courts have failed to respond adequately to the pervasive 
problem of litigation misconduct. See Pollis, supra note 29, at 107–08. 
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attack the sufficiency of the pleaded allegations)84 and motions for 
summary judgment (which challenge the need for a trial to resolve factual 
disputes).85  Both types of motions, if successful, allow the movant to avoid 
trial.  Their prevalence emphasizes the reality that litigation is focused on 
pretrial disposition.  While these motions are ostensibly designed to curtail 
litigation costs, they (summary judgment motions in particular) have 
become a source of fee generation for lawyers and, relatedly, a settlement 
incentive for the parties because of the cost of opposing them.  These 
incentives are separate from the underlying merits of the dispute. 
1.  Rule 12(b)(6) Motions 
In 2007, the Supreme Court introduced heightened pleading with its 
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.86  The scholarly literature is 
replete with responses and critiques of Twombly and the Court’s 2009 
follow-up decision Ashcroft v. Iqbal.87  Some, like Judge Patrick E. 
Higginbotham, ascribe the rise of the heightened pleading standard to the 
exorbitant costs of discovery:  “[u]nable to control discovery, the regulatory 
response has been to attempt to limit access to it” by dismissing cases 
before discovery begins.88  The Twombly decision itself reflects this 
intention.89 
While litigators once assumed that dismissal was generally available only 
if the pleaded factual allegations were either insufficient to support a claim 
or not actionable at law,90 that assumption has now faded.  Today, the 
available inferences to be drawn from the factual allegations and their 
plausibility are subject to judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage.91  The very 
subjectivity of these criteria92 affords lawyers every incentive to exploit 
them, especially given the substantial possibility that “a tie goes to the 
defendant.”93  And, of course, the cost of drafting and opposing these 
motions aids in fee generation (although, admittedly, a successful motion 
would deprive the winning lawyer of the fees associated with the discovery 
 
 84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 85. See id. 56. 
 86. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 87. 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
435, 450 n.95 (2014) (discussing the body of literature on Twombly and Iqbal). 
 88. Higginbotham, supra note 16, at 750–51. 
 89. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (“[I]t is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an 
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that proceeding to 
antitrust discovery can be expensive.” (citation omitted)). 
 90. E.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(“Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient 
facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”). 
 91. See Pollis, supra note 87, at 451, 460. 
 92. Indeed, “Iqbal has been resoundingly criticized for, among other things, failing to 
articulate a cohesive measure by which lower courts can differentiate between 
unsubstantiated conclusory allegations (apparently implausible under Iqbal) and factually 
detailed assertions sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss (apparently plausible).” Id. at 
451. 
 93. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 626 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., 
dissenting). 
2017] BUSTING UP THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY 2109 
that dismissal would avoid).  While commentators may debate the wisdom 
or significance of these decisions, “there seems to be no doubt that the cases 
have increased the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.”94  Thus, 
whether or not warranted or successful, the battle over pleading sufficiency 
has become a major tool of the pretrial industry. 
2.  Summary Judgment Motions 
In 2010, Judge Higginbotham observed that motions for summary 
judgment have “displaced the trial as the destination point for litigation.”95  
Indeed, the summary judgment motion has become a staple of litigation 
since the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy of decisions clarifying the summary 
judgment standards96 and tacitly encouraging trial judges to employ pretrial 
disposition more regularly.97  Empirical evidence suggests that trial judges 
have done exactly that.98  And, of course, summary judgment arguments 
depend heavily on evidentiary materials developed through discovery,99 so 
those two components of the pretrial industry exacerbate each other. 
Properly granted summary judgment motions obviously achieve 
efficiency goals because they spare all parties the cost of trial while 
disposing of cases on their merits.  But the added efficiency is offset by 
improper grants of summary judgment (particularly when reversed on 
appeal, leading to additional trial court proceedings)100 and by summary 
judgment denials, proper or improper, that provide no added value except to 
the attorneys who bill their time for working on them.101  They can easily 
become, as one commentator has noted, “a net drain on society.”102 
 
 94. Freer, supra note 3, at 1515–16. 
 95. Higginbotham, supra note 16, at 746. 
 96. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 97. “[T]he 1986 Supreme Court trilogy is striking because of the strong pro-summary 
judgment language found throughout the Court’s three opinions.” Arthur R. Miller, The 
Pretrial Rush to Judgment:  Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and 
Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 982, 1028 (2003). 
 98. Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 193 
(“Empirical evidence suggests that the standard for summary judgment may have become 
more relaxed over time, in the sense that courts are more willing to grant motions for 
summary judgment today than in years past.”). 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (listing available summary judgment evidence, which 
includes “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, . . . admissions, [and] 
interrogatory answers”); see also Langbein, supra note 9, at 570 (summary judgment 
motions are “routinely based on discovery product”). 
 100. More than 20 percent of summary judgments are reversed on appeal in federal 
courts, and the figures are even higher in the Federal Circuit. See Ted L. Field, “Judicial 
Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit:  An Empirical Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 721, 765 
(2012). 
 101. I do not mean to ignore the value of clarity that a trial court can offer in denying 
summary judgment, either by narrowing the factual disputes that will define the trial or in 
resolving the parties’ disagreements over the applicable law.  But “the summary judgment 
usually saves time only when it is granted and terminates a case or is sufficiently partially 
granted to streamline trial of a case.” Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:  The Supreme 
Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication 
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III.  A TWO-PRONGED SOLUTION 
FOR DIFFUSING THE PRETRIAL INDUSTRY 
Some scholars have called for the restoration of the civil trial as an 
antidote to the injustices of the pretrial industry103 or as a prescription to 
reallocate to civil juries their constitutional power to resolve factual 
disputes.104  It is unlikely that the judicial system will heed these calls, 
given the perceived costs of trial and the institutional inertia that has taken 
root over the decades.  Indeed, the political antipathy toward the civil 
justice system105 has prompted reforms that have made trial less likely, not 
more,106 and there is no reason to believe that the trend will reverse course. 
Nevertheless, there are reforms that would curtail some of the costs of the 
pretrial industry and restore emphasis on the merits of a case as the primary 
basis for evaluating settlement.  I propose two such reforms here:  
(1) holding summary jury trials early in the litigation—before motion 
practice and discovery—to offer the parties a neutral evaluation of the 
merits by community members who would approximate the composition of 
a jury in a real trial, with consequences for parties who reject the results of 
the summary trial and then do worse at an actual trial and (2) routine 
appointment of special discovery masters to ensure that the costs of abusive 
discovery, financial and otherwise, do not play an outsized role in 
influencing outcomes. 
A.  Routinely Holding Summary Jury Trials 
“The summary jury trial is a nonbinding . . . process presided over by a 
district or magistrate judge and designed to promote settlement in trial-
ready cases.”107  Its purpose is to “provide[] litigants and their counsel with 
 
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 172 (1988).  As Arthur Miller has noted, “the expense and 
frequency of litigating summary judgment motions and the frequency of appeals from 
decisions granting them have undermined arguments espousing summary judgment as 
beneficial to judicial efficiency.” Pollis, supra note 87, at 490 (citing Miller, supra note 13, 
at 312 n.98). 
 102. D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 876 (2006). 
 103. See, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 16, at 762. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & 
Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy:  Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011). 
 104. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 103, at 402 (contending that “diminution of jury 
trials . . . is a tragedy”); Pollis, supra note 87, at 490 (“We must preserve the inference-
drawing function that the Seventh Amendment clearly bestows on individual citizens who 
participate, through jury service, in the political process.”). 
 105. See generally Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law:  The Recoil Against Expanding 
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002); Miller, supra note 13, at 302–03 (“Political 
candidates and office holders score cheap points with attacks on our justice system, cloaking 
themselves in the deceptive mantle of ‘tort reform.’”). 
 106. Professor Miller characterizes the impediments to trial as deliberately imposed 
“early-termination developments” designed “to suit the economic or political agendas of 
powerful interest groups at the expense of the original philosophical objectives of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Miller, supra note 13, at 310. 
 107. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 81 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL LITIGATION 
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an advisory verdict after an abbreviated hearing in which counsel present 
summary evidence to a jury.”108  It functions as a “sort of mock jury” in 
which “jurors are drawn from the actual jury pool and seated for an 
abbreviated trial.”109  “Witnesses are generally not called,” but instead 
lawyers summarize the anticipated evidence as they attempt to persuade the 
mock jurors to reach an advisory verdict in their client’s favor.110  The 
whole process generally takes a day or less.111 
The concept of summary jury trials has been around for over thirty 
years.112  But only about 25 percent of courts authorize it,113 and the 
procedure “has largely disappeared, in part because it was unavailable until 
too late in the litigation process.”114  Since summary jury trials are “thought 
to be most useful after discovery is complete,”115 there was no particular 
advantage in holding a summary jury trial rather than proceeding 
immediately to a full-blown trial. 
But there is no reason that summary jury trials need to occur so late in the 
litigation process, after the pretrial industry has done its damage.  To the 
contrary, in cases that involve factual disputes as to either liability or 
damages,116 permitting or requiring litigants to proceed to a summary jury 
trial before discovery begins would afford meaningful feedback to the 
parties about the relative strengths and weaknesses of their positions at an 
early stage of litigation.117  In effect, the parties could factor the results of 
the summary jury trial into their calculus of whether to proceed to discovery 
or whether to settle immediately.  And, having not yet incurred the bulk of 
the litigation expenses, the parties may have an easier time reaching an 
agreement.118 
 
MANAGEMENT MANUAL], http://www2.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CivLit2D.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/C5W6-GK99].  The Civil Litigation Management Manual “is for the guidance of 
judges.  It is not intended to be relied upon as authority, and it creates no rights or duties.” 
Id. at i. 
 108. Id. at 81. 
 109. Bert I. Huang, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1372 (2013). 
 110. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 81. 
 111. Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender:  Summary Jury Trial as a Means 
to Overcome Iqbal’s Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation and 
Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1149, 1186 (2010). 
 112. See Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of 
Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984). 
 113. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 82. 
 114. J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 
1740 (2012); see also CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 82 
(“[F]ew cases are referred to this process.”). 
 115. CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 81. 
 116. Summary jury trials would not be particularly useful in cases that involve no 
contested issues or that turn only on issues of law. 
 117. See Welsh, supra note 111, at 1185–88. 
 118. See Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong 
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2013) (“Late settlements appear to be a more 
common mistake than premature settlements because a significant percentage of cases settle 
after most or all discovery has been completed, on the eve of trial, or on the courthouse 
steps.”). But see id. at 573 (“Settlements consummated before the litigants possess adequate 
information, whether of factual or a legal nature, may be premature.”). 
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Summary jury trials, at least as they are traditionally set up, will not 
alone accomplish the goal of discouraging the pretrial industry, even if they 
occur earlier in the process.  There are generally no consequences of 
disregarding the summary jury’s verdict and proceeding to trial, other than 
the cost of the trial itself and the obvious risk that the trial result will be the 
same.119  An additional incentive is warranted to require the parties to make 
a rational choice about whether to proceed.  For that reason, a party that is 
unwilling to honor the summary jury’s verdict, and who instead forces her 
adversary to proceed to discovery, dispositive motions, and trial, must bear 
additional risk.  I propose the risk of fee shifting:  in the event the ultimate 
adjudicated result for the recalcitrant party is no better than the summary 
jury’s verdict, the trial court should have the discretion to require that party 
to bear its adversary’s attorney’s fees.  Imposing that risk will force the 
parties to think very carefully about the wisdom of proceeding.120 
In the context of summary jury trials, a fee-shifting proposal makes sense 
because the party potentially charged with its adversary’s fees is responsible 
for the decision to begin the expensive discovery, dispositive motion, and 
trial process.  A rational decision maker would accept the summary jury’s 
verdict and cut off the pretrial industry at the legs unless she believes either 
that the summary jury’s verdict was grossly aberrant or that proceeding to 
discovery would uncover additional evidence that would strengthen her 
case on summary judgment or at trial. 
Of course, the proposal has its imperfections.  The most obvious is 
information asymmetry; having not yet undertaken any discovery, the 
parties would not have access to the full panoply of evidence to exploit at 
the summary jury trial that they would hope to have by the time of a real 
trial, thus reducing the accuracy of the advisory verdict and the value the 
parties would place on it.  The asymmetry arises because the problem 
would perhaps afflict plaintiffs more than defendants,121 and it would be 
particularly acute in cases where a party has concealed evidence or where 
as-yet-unprocured expert testimony is crucial to the outcome.  But plaintiffs 
must have a good-faith factual basis for filing a lawsuit,122 and there is no 
 
 119. See CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 107, at 81 (“If no 
settlement is reached, the case returns to the trial track.”). 
 120. My proposal mirrors a similar proposal I have made in another context:  in claims 
that turn on an actor’s state of mind, I have proposed that courts should restore to juries the 
power to resolve competing inferences, but in the event a jury reaches a defense verdict, it 
should also evaluate the strength of the plaintiff’s evidence. See Pollis, supra note 87, at 
484–85.  If the evidence is extremely weak, the court should have the discretion to require 
the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees, taking into account a number of 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. See id. at 485–86.  This proposal is aimed at 
reducing the number of state-of-mind cases dismissed at the pleading or summary judgment 
stage, while requiring plaintiffs to think carefully about whether their evidence is strong 
enough to run the risk of an adverse fee award. 
 121. See Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 159 
(2011) (describing “large information asymmetries” in certain kinds of cases, “such as civil 
rights, constitutional, and employment discrimination cases,” that can make it difficult for 
plaintiffs to plead adequately under heightened-pleading standards). 
 122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (stating that counsel’s signature on a complaint 
constitutes representation that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
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policy justification for shielding them from the scrutiny of a summary jury 
if their lawyers have met their ethical obligations before filing.123  In some 
ways, then, the summary jury trial functions as another vehicle for 
scrutinizing the adequacy of the pleaded allegations,124 but it does so 
through the lens of individuals who approximate actual jurors rather than 
the “members of an ‘elite class’” of judges (as motion practice does).125  If 
the lack of information at the summary jury trial stage is the basis for a 
favorable defense verdict, then it is not unfair to allocate to the plaintiff the 
risk that she will not uncover sufficient information in discovery to succeed 
at later stages.  In short, if the party with less access to relevant information 
makes the calculated decision to proceed with discovery instead of settling 
for the amount reflected in the summary jury trial result, that party would 
bear the risk that the information obtained through discovery will not 
support that choice.  Moreover, the parties always have the option of 
revisiting settlement after discovery but before summary judgment or trial, 
thus giving them an opportunity to avoid fee shifting if discovery does not 
bear fruit. 
A second imperfection is that parties would have an incentive to misstate 
the facts at the summary jury trial to increase the likelihood of a favorable 
result, thus distorting the settlement calculus and preventing a reasoned 
assessment of the fee-shifting risk.  Judicial involvement would be useful 
here, both at the front end (in resolving disputes over the content of the 
presentations) and the back (in determining whether to award fees).  A party 
who misrepresents the facts at the summary jury trial obviously should not 
be able to exploit the skewed result in later seeking a fee award.  And, to the 
extent the misrepresentation is found to have been both deliberate and 
material, it could warrant the imposition of sanctions.126 
It is also true that summary jury trials would require the time and 
resources of both the parties and the presiding judge, so it has the potential 
to be costly.  The extent of those resources will obviously depend on a 
number of factors, such as the extent to which the court will entertain 
objections to legitimacy of the factual representations in the parties’ 
presentations or will deliver substantive jury instructions on the applicable 
substantive law.  The absence of the judge’s involvement on these kinds of 
 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery”). 
 123. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer 
shall not bring . . . a proceeding, or assert . . . an issue therein, unless there is a basis 
in . . . fact for doing so that is not frivolous”); see also id. r. 3.3(a)(1) (stating that a lawyer 
shall not knowingly “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal”). 
 124. See Welsh, supra note 111, at 1186 (proposing “the use of summary jury trial to aid 
courts as they determine whether to allow plaintiffs to proceed into discovery”). 
 125. See Pollis, supra note 87, at 473 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 126. One colleague at the colloquium objected to the fee-shifting proposal because of the 
disproportionate risk it would create for the party, typically the plaintiff, with less 
prediscovery access to information.  That concern is well taken.  Vesting the court with the 
discretion to impose sanctions for misrepresentations made during the summary jury trial is 
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matters would likely distort the result, thus reducing the utility of the 
verdict as a settlement tool.  Although the court’s involvement would 
obviously be burdensome, there are ways of mitigating that burden, such as 
requiring the parties to work to reach agreement and shifting fees to any 
party who deviates from a fair representation of the facts or the law.  Even 
if the legal system must absorb these costs, the corollary benefit from the 
earlier settlement would go a long way toward mitigating them and perhaps 
result in a net savings.  Judge Posner has called for “‘hesitation’ in the use 
of summary jury trials” because they “enlarge jury service,”127 but that 
concern also seems misguided if the process ultimately ends up reducing 
the need for judicial resources down the road. 
At bottom, requiring parties to engage in a summary jury trial at the 
outset of litigation would give them an opportunity to hear an objective 
reaction to their claims and defenses before the pretrial industry takes its 
toll.  It would empower them to make better-informed decisions about 
proceeding with the lawsuit at a point in time when they have not yet borne 
the exorbitant costs of litigation.  And it would also afford “a marginalized 
plaintiff with the opportunity to tell her story to a judge, jury and decision-
makers for the defendant,” thus “approximat[ing] the experience of 
procedural justice provided by a ‘day in court.’”128 
B.  Greater Reliance on Special Discovery Masters 
The second proposal I offer to curtail the costs of the pretrial industry is 
the more frequent appointment of special discovery masters.  We need a 
judicial system that is more responsive to the actual experiences of civil 
litigation.  It is thus imperative that we elevate the role of discovery 
supervision to a position commensurate with the burdens discovery 
imposes. 
The need for greater supervision over discovery was one of the primary 
drivers of the 2015 amendments to the civil rules.  The position papers 
submitted in advance of the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation129 (often 
referenced as the “Duke Conference”) lamented that judges were not active 
enough in supervising discovery.130  Seventy-two percent of attorneys 
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surveyed by the American Bar Association Section of Litigation “believe 
that early intervention helps to limit discovery,” but 60 percent also 
“believe that judges do not enforce [the existing] mechanisms to limit 
discovery.”131  This concern is not new.132 
Unfortunately, the amendments did very little to fix that problem.  The 
drafters articulated the conflict in the competing objectives they sought to 
balance: 
The challenge is to achieve [adequate judicial supervision] on a 
consistent, institutional basis without interfering with the independence 
and creativity of each judge and district responding to the specific mix of 
cases and docket conditions, and without interfering with the effective 
handling of many cases under existing rules and practices.133 
In the end, they opted for anemic precatory language that ultimately leaves 
the supervision of discovery to the discretion of individual judges, just as it 
always has been, and practitioners have bemoaned this missed 
opportunity.134 
Left to their own devices, judges are not likely to become more active in 
the resolution of discovery disputes under the new rules.  Indeed, “[t]here 
are very few parts of the job that judges dislike more.”135  Judges face many 
competing demands on their dockets—criminal cases, dispositive motions, 
requests for accelerated injunctive relief, settlement conferences, and (when 
it occurs) trial—so they must allocate their time and resources, and 
discovery disputes tend to fall to the bottom of the list.136  And, while 
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judges often delegate the discovery-management task to magistrates,137 
magistrates cannot dedicate themselves sufficiently to discovery matters 
given the range of their responsibilities and the increased frequency with 
which judges refer other types of case-management responsibilities to 
them.138 
Nevertheless, discovery disputes have an outsized impact on the cost of 
civil litigation and demand more compulsory supervision from the courts.  
To that end, courts should make more frequent use of their authority to 
appoint special masters to supervise discovery, as the civil rules 
authorize.139  The use of special masters is growing, but “the number of 
reported appointments is still relatively small.”140  Courts should embrace 
their authority to appoint special masters on a more regular basis to 
supervise discovery disputes.  Special masters dedicated to that task, free of 
the other responsibilities that judges and magistrates must fulfill, will be in 
a better position to achieve the goal of ensuring that parties do not abuse the 
discovery process. 
Moreover, the cost of routinely appointing special masters should not be 
an impediment.  As a threshold matter, there will be no need for a special 
master’s time if the parties settle their dispute after the summary jury trial.  
In any event, courts are already authorized to allocate the special master’s 
payment “among the parties after considering the nature and amount of the 
controversy, the parties’ means, and the extent to which any party is more 
responsible than other parties for the reference to a master.”141  In ordinary 
circumstances, parties whose discovery conduct necessitates the services of 
the special master should pay her fees, an allocation the discovery rules 
already contemplate.142  Allocating the payment according to these 
equitable factors will deter parties from discovery abuse. 
One colloquium colleague suggested that special masters may be more 
appropriate for some cases (presumably complex or high-stakes cases in 
which discovery disputes tend to arise more frequently and contentiously) 
than for others.  The comment is reasonable, but practitioners will also 
confirm that discovery can get unnecessarily contentious even in the most 
unlikely of cases.  So we should not establish fixed criteria to guide judicial 
discretion in deciding to appoint a special master.  We should instead rely 
on its utility in streamlining discovery disputes, as well as the influence that 
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potentially paying for the special master’s services will have on the parties’ 
willingness to engage in improper discovery conduct. 
In short, relying more routinely on special masters to supervise discovery 
will bring much-needed control to the cost-intensive discovery process that 
fuels the pretrial industry.  The cost of discovery will decrease, at least to 
the extent abusive behavior drives it, or it will be borne by the party who 
deserves to bear it. 
CONCLUSION 
Like most endemic problems, the pretrial industry is rooted in human 
nature.  We behave in ways that are most likely to reward us.  As the civil 
trial disappeared, the pretrial industry evolved because it enriches lawyers 
and often extracts favorable settlements.  But the costs to our system are 
enormous, and the settlements are often mispriced. 
Judges are also human.  No matter how much we cajole them or 
promulgate aspirational rules, they will never have the time or adequate 
incentives to curtail the pretrial industry.  Indeed, nondiscretionary systemic 
change is the only way out of the money pit that the legal profession has 
dug for itself.  By requiring civil litigants to participate in summary jury 
trials and imposing fee shifting on those who ignore the results, we can 
offer litigants a day in court that will arm them with important information 
about the strengths and weaknesses of their case, which, coupled with risk 
of proceeding to trial, should foster more frequent settlement.  And by 
regularly appointing special discovery masters, we can provide supervision 
over the discovery process that its enormous influence on the cost of 
litigation warrants. 
In sum, we can put an end to the pretrial industry, or at least reduce its 
magnitude.  The question remains whether we truly have the determination 
to do it. 
